The AB, or Stage IV, error is observed frequently proposed alternative to the Piagewhen 8-10-month-old infants are required to tian view is that infants do not remember the search for objects hidden at two successive second hiding location (e.g., Bjork & Cumlocations. They can find the object after it has mings, 1984; Cummings & Bjork, 1983 ; Fox, been hidden at a first location, but when an Kagan, & Weiskopf, 1979; Gratch, Appel, object is subsequently hidden at a different Evans, LeCompte, & Wright, 1974 ; Harris, location, many infants continue to search at 1973). By this view, infants may have the cathe initial place, even though the displace-pacity for symbolic representation of objects ment is visible and the infant attends to it. but are prevented fiom expressing it by their The error has been viewed by Piaget and limited menlory abilities. Evidence favoring a many others as a key source of evidence con-memory-based interpretation derives from cerning the development of object perma-studies that have demonstrated that the frenence in infancy. According to the Piagetian quency of AB errors increases with longer deinterpretation, 8-10-month-old infants lack lays between object hiding and search (e.g., the capacity for symbolic representation and Fox et al., 1979; Gratch et al., 1974) , and that have an immature concept of the object that is similarity of test alternatives influences the tied inextricably to the sensorimotor opera-accuracy of search (Bjork & Cummings, 1984;  tions that are performed on it. Cummings & Bjork, 1983) . Consistent with
In spite of the popularity of the Piagetian this interpretation is a good deal of evidence view, several alternative accounts of the a that 8-10-month-old infants perform poorly error have been offered. These include the on tests that require delayed recall of recently experienced stimuli, whereas 14-16-monthpossibility that the error occurs as a result of old infants perform relatively well on delayed the difficulties that 8-10-month-old infants recall tests, when they no longer commit the have with spatial orientation (e.g., Butter-AB error (see Schacter & Moscovitch, 1984 , worth, 1975 , 1976 , object identity rules for review). (Moore & Meltzoff, 1978) , and the coordination of action sequences (e.g., Diamond & A possibly converging operation (Garner, Goldman-Rakic, 1983 ). However, the most Hake, & Eriksen, 1956) concerning a mem-ory-based interpretation of the f l error is to observed by Piaget: The patients could restudy adults whose memory is impaired but member the first location, but not the second.
who clearly have the capacity for symbolic We will refer to this analogue of the AB error representation of objects, such as patients as mnemonic precedence. with severe memory disorders (amnesic patients). Such patients typically have sustained We developed two object search tasks for use with amnesic patients. In the room search damage to limbic structures that mediate task, common objects were placed at different memory functions, and thus have difficulty re-locations in a testing room. In the container membering events that have occurred since search task, small items were placed in differthe trauma (for review, see Hirst 1982; Moscovitch, 1982; Schacter & Crovitz, 1977;  ent drawers of a square container. In both Squire, 1982) . However, these same patients tasks, objects were hidden at one location (A) possess relatively normal intellectual and linfor three successive trials, and were then hidden at a new location (B) on the fourth trial. guistic abilities, can gain access to general Patients were required to remember the locaknowledge, and have no difficulty describing tion of the object on each trial. familiar objects when they are out of view. The logic of the_ converging operation is as follows: If the AB error reflects the absence of Experiment 1 object permanence, it should occur in infants Method but not in adults with intact objeg permasubjects.-Eight patients with organic nence If, on the other hand, the emor is memory disorders participated in the study attributable to a deficiency in Pro- (Table 1) .Five were diagnosed as in the ear]y cesses, then patients with memory disorders stages of ~ l ~ hdisease; the others bei ~ ~ ~ ? ~ may perform like 8-10-month-old infants on an object search task.
came amnesic after closed-head injury, rup tured anterior communicating artery aneuIn the present article, we report two ex-rysm, and anoxia secondary to-cardiac arrest, periments in which amnesic patients exhib-respectively. All patients are characterized by ited a pattern of search that resembles in sev-severe memory disorders; they have little or era1 respects the classical phenomenon no recollection of everyday events and per- Materials.-Several different common objects were used in the room search task: a stapler, pencil, stopwatch, cassette tape, eraser, fork, and styrofoam cup. Smaller objects were used in the container search task: a metal clip, elastic band, twist tie, and piece of paper. They were hidden in one of four drawers of an 8.5 x 8.5-cm plastic container. Each drawer of the square container had a different color-red, yellow, blue, or green-and was located on a different side of the container. This single container was used in all trials of the container search task.
Design and Procedure
The room task was always administered prior to the container search task. Both tasks began with a patient sitting across a testing table from the experimenter. The experimenter indicated either that he would be placing some objects in different parts of the room, or that he would place them in different drawers of the small container; in both cases, patients were instructed that they should try to remember the location and identity (name) of the objects on each trial. In the room search task, the experimenter then got up and placed an object in back of some books that were on a desk located 10 feet directly behind the patient. In the container search task, the experimenter placed an object in one of the four drawers of the container, which was situated on the testing table in fiont of the patient. We will refer to this first location as location A. In both tasks, the experimenter verified that the patients registered the hiding place by having them state immediately the location and identity of the object. This was followed by a 2%-min interval filled with conversation. Patients were then asked to state the location and identity of the object, and they attempted to retrieve it by walking to the desk (location A) in the room search task, or by opening a drawer in the container search task. If a patient retrieved the object from the correct location on any trial, he or she returned it to the experimenter, who placed it out of the patient's view. Following completion of the first trial at location A (Al), different objects were placed at the same location on each of two consecutive trials (A2 and A3), and the tests of object location and identity were administered in the same fashion. A new object was then hidden at a new location (we refer to it as location B) in a different part of the room or in a different drawer, and the same immediate and delayed tests were repeated. If subjects searched incorrectly on the B trial, they were immediately asked if they remembered whether an object had been placed at any other location on that trial. The experimenter then showed the subject the correct location, either by walking to location B and retrieving the object in the room search task, or by opening the correct drawer and removing the object in the container search task.
In the room search task, the trial at location B was followed by two additional trials at location A (Aq and As). Then a new object was placed in a third location (C). Location C was a place on the desk directly in front of the books that concealed location A. Thus, the object placed at location C was not hidden, but was plainly visible to the patient. Several other objects were placed on the desk near location C. None of these objects had been used at any point in the experiment. The tests were the same as on previous trials, with one exception. If a patient searched incorrectly on the C trial, he or she was then required to look carefully at the various objects on the desk and to state which, if any, had been placed there by the experimenter at the beginning of the trial. This trial was included because we wanted to determine whether amnesic patients would also exhibit mnemonic precedence even when the object was visible.
In both the room and container search tasks, the objects that were used on particular trials were determined randomly. These objects were kept in a box by the experimenter, out of subjects' view, on all trials except the one in which the object was used. In the con-tainer search task, the drawer that served as one of the patients who had searched perselocation A was decided randomly for each veratively stated that he thought the object subject. The drawer that served as location B might be at location B; the other five either was always one of the two drawers on a side denied or were uncertain that another of the square container adjacent to location A, location had been used, or made erroneous the exact one being selected randomly for guesses about a possible location. When the each patient.
object was returned to location A after the B trial, six of the eight amnesic patients Results searched correctly on trial &, and all of them Table 2 presents the outcome of each did so on trial As. On the C trial, with the trial for each patient in the room and con-object in full view, seven of the eight amnesic tainer search tasks. Consider first the results patients searched ~erseveratively at location concerning patients' memory for object loca-A, whereas only one control did, ~' ( 1 , N = tion in the room search task. On all immediate 16) = 9.00, p < .01, and this patient imtests, each patient stated the location of the mediately corrected his error without any object when it was out of view and then re-prompting. At the conclusion of trial C, when trieved it, indicating that they had registered patients were required to examine the several the object's location on each trial. On delayed objects visible on the desk and to indicate tests, both amnesics and controls retrieved which one had been "hidden" there, only two the object correctly from location A on each of of the seven amnesics who had searched at the first three trials. On the B trials, however, location A chose the correct one. six of the eieht amnesics failed to recall the location of &e object, and instead searched An almost identical pattern of results was perseveratively at location A, whereas all of obtained in the container search task (Table the controls remembered that the object had 2). Performance on the immediate test was been placed at location B, x2(1, N = 16) = perfect for all subjects at all locations. On the 9.60, p < .01. When asked if there was any-delayed recall test at location A, all subjects where else that an object had been hidden, searched correctly, except for one error com- 
Consider next the patients' recall of object identity. Performance was nearly perfect on the first trial (Al) in both the room and container search tasks (Table 2) . On the second trial (Az), the amnesic patients' performance dropped substantially and remained low on subsequent trials. In contrast, performance of control patients was near-perfect on all trials and was higher than that of amnesics on each trial except the first one, all ~' ( 1 , N = 16) > 4.26. The 54 recall errors made by amnesic patients on the two tasks consisted of 29 perseverative recalls of an object from one of the previous trials and 25 nonperseverative errors of commission and omission. Only six recall errors were made by the controls; three were perseverative and three were errors of omission.
Taken together, the results of the room and container search tasks indicate that amnesic patients exhibit a phenomenon of mnemonic precedence that resembles the AB error made by infants. Before considering seriou~ly the idea that mnemonic precedence and AB errors are attributable to memory failure, we will first examine an alternative interpretation drawn from the work of Diamond and Goldman-Rakic (1983) . These authors proposed that the AB error is attributable to perseverative tendencies associated with poorly developed frontal lobes in infants. As evidence for this view, they showed that adult monkeys with dorsolateral frontal lesions committed the AB error, whereas normal monkeys did not. Though compelling, this finding does not demonstrate conclusively that the source of error in adult humans, or even infants, is impaired frontal functions. It is often difficult to distinguish between the effects of perseverative tendencies associated with frontal damage and memory difficulties produced by limbic damage, particularly the hippocampus, unless there is a detailed comparison of performance of two groups with the appropriate lesions. Since Diamond and Goldman-Rakic did not include a hippocampal control group, we do not know whether similar deficits would be observed in monkeys with hippocampal lesions. With respect to the present study, the work of Diamond and Goldman-Rakic raises the possibility that patients' failure to find objects at locations B and C results from perseverative tendencies attributable to frontal lobe damage, and not from poor memory. It is well known that patients with frontal lobe damage whose memory is relatively unimpaired perseverate on tasks that are similar to ours (Milner, 1964) . Indeed, the effects of this perseverative tendency can be misinterpreted as a memory deficit in different situations (Moscovitch, 1982) . Our amnesic patients have some signs of frontal lobe pathology, as indicated by their poor performance on the Wisconsin Card Sort, a widely used test that is sensitive to dorsolateral frontal lobe damage. Amnesics completed an average of two out of six categories, and made a fairly high percentage of perseverative errors (30.3%). However, their card-sorting performance did not differ significantly from that of patient controls, who completed an average of 2.5 categories and committed 32.0% perseverative errors. This observation suggests that frontal impairment alone is not sufficient to produce deficits on our object search tasks. Nevertheless, to evaluate the hypothesis that mnemonic precedence is solely attributable to frontal lobe damage in humans, it is necessary to test patients with bilateral frontal lesions who are not densely amnesic. Consequently, in Experiment 2 we administered both of our object search tasks to three patients with verified bilateral frontal lobe damage and perseverative tendencies.
Experiment 2

Method
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 in all respects except that only three patients with bilateral frontal lesions participated in it. The etiologies of the three frontal patients are, respectively, gunshot wound (patient l), trauma (patient 2), and meningioma (patient 3). CT scans showed large bilateral frontal lobe lesions in each of the three patients. The lesions extended over four to 15 consecutive 7-mm slices on the CT scan and involved primarily the medial frontal regions bilaterally with slight extension to the dorsolateral surface (patient 1); the right inferomedial and left orbital, medial, and dorsolateral frontal areas (patient 2); and the medial frontal regions bilaterally (patient 3). Patient 1(age = 47; IQ = 84; MQ = 99) and patient 3 (age = 63;IQ = 80; MQ = 89) were similar to our controls in terms of age and cognitive ability. Patient 2 was somewhat younger (age = 35) and had more memory problems than our controls (IQ = 106; MQ = 84), although he is not characterized clinically as amnesic. All three patients perseverated frequently on the Wisconsin Card Sort. None obtained more than three categories, and they committed, respectively, 22%,23%,and 72% perseverative errors.
Results and Discussion
All three patients easily remembered all locations of the object in both the room and container search tasks; there was no hint of perseverative search at location A. In recall of object identity, only one patient made a single error on a trial at location A in the room search task. The excellent performance of these patients suggests that perseverative tendencies associated with frontal lobe damage are not sufficient to prgduce mnemonic precedence; poor memory appears to be necessary for obtaining the phenomenon. Nevertheless, the present results do not permit us to reject the hypothesis that frontal lobe damage plays a role in generating precedence effects, because our amnesic patients had some signs of frontal lobe pathology. Mnemonic precedence may thus depend on a combination of poor memory and perseverative tendencies associated with fiontal lobe damage. It remains to be determined whether severely amnesic patients who are entirely free of frontal lobe signs exhibit mnemonic precedence.
General Discussion
The present experiments have demonstrated that the performance of amnesic adults on object search tasks is similar to the performance of 8-10-month-old infants. Amnesic patients remembered the location of an object at an initial place and continued to search there even after another object had been hidden at a second location.
Before considering the possible implications of our ~esults for theoretical interpretation of the M 3 error, it must be acknowledged that the phenomenon of mnemonic precedence that we have observed differs in several respects from the classic AB error. The most obvious difference is that the 2%-min delay used in our tasks is substantially longer than the delays used in studies of infants, which typically do not exceed 10-12 sec. We used this longer delay because adult arnnesics have at their disposal rehearsal strategies and cognitive capacities, poorly developed in infants, that can be used to prolong their intact short-term or primary memory. The inclusion of 2% min of distracting conversation, however, forced amnesic patients to rely on their impaired long-term memory. It is this kind of memory that we assume is required for performance on object search tasks that are given to infants, even though the nominal delays are quite short Thus, although the delays may differ in absolute terms, our hypothesis is that their functional consequences are similar.
A second difference is that the actual tasks that we gave to the amnesic patients are not identical to the ones that have been given to infants. Admittedly, the room search task differed substantially from the typical infant search task, which usually involves looking for objects placed in hiding wells that are directly in front of the infant. The containersearch task, however, resembled the traditional object search tasks in most respects. The fact that the pattern of results on the two tasks was identical suggests that our findings have some generality and are not attributable to an idiosyncratic feature of one task. In both tasks, however, we used different objects on each trial, whereas the typical procedure in studies of infants is to use the same object across trials. Also, the verbal instructions that our subjects received were, of course, different fiom nonverbal task demonstrations that are necessarily used to "instruct" infants. We gave verbal instructions because our patients would have attempted to code any type of instructions verbally and because we knew no good reason why such an instructional difference would be crucial.
Consideration of experimental findings concerning infants' search behavior also suggests possible differences between mnemonic precedence and the a error. For example, Cummings and Bjork (1983; see also Bjork & Cummings, 1984) failed to observe perseverative search on B trials under conditions in which infants had the opportunity to err by searching at locations other than A (i.e., on a five-choice hiding task). Infants in their experiments tended to search at places spatially proximate to location B. By contrast, patients in our study searched perseveratively at location A even though they could have searched elsewhere in both tasks, and even though location A was not spatially proximate to location B in the room search task (in the container search task, location A was one of two locations spatially proximate to location B). However, our tasks differed from the one used by Cummings and Bjork, which involved a linear array of five hiding places, each marked by a blue cover. Although we do not know how amnesic patients would perform on their task, the question clearly merits experimental investigation. Another possible difference -between mnemonic precedence and the AB error is suggested by evidence that infants' search performance improves across repeated tests within a session (Cornell, 1981) . No pertinent evidence exists re-garding possible improvements in amnesics' search performance. Note, however, that amnesics' performance on various learning tasks does improve with repetition (e.g., Cohen & Squire, 1980; Glisky, Schacter, & Tulving, in press; Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968; Moscovitch, 1982; Schacter, Rich, & Stampp, 1985) , and it is possible that search performance would improve with repeated testing. A further potential discrepancy between infants' and amnesics' search performance arises from our finding that most of the amnesic patients failed to recognize the object at location C. We do not know whether infants would exhibit an analogous phenomenon under similar conditions.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we must be cautious in attempting to relate our results to developmental studies. We are also aware that the resemblances between mnemonic precedence and the AD error need not imply that they are mediated by the same underlying processes. Nonetheless, we wish to note some implications of our data for theories of cognitive development in igfancy. Foremost among these is that the AB error may not reflect an immature object concept in infants. The fact that adult amnesic patients with well-developed object concept make errors similar to those made by infants on objeg search tasks suggests that committing the AB error need not imply defective object concept. Our data are, however, consistentyith memory-based interpretations of the AB error.
Studies of memory development in infancy provide support for the idea that the kind of memory capacity necessary for performing object search tasks is poorly developed in 8-12-month-old infants. Schacter and Moscovitch (1984) , in a review of the infant memory literature, noted that the period from 8-12 months appears to be a watershed in the development of infant memory. Prior to 8 months, memory in infants can only be demonstrated with habituation and conditioning tests that may not require recollection of past events; after 8 months, infants begin to exhibit forms of recall and recognition that share some characteristics with adult memory abilities. Schacter and Moscovitch further noted that this late-developing form of memory resembles the kind of memory that is impaired in amnesia. It is the inefficient functioning of this late-developing form of memory in infants and amnesics, we-believe, that is largely responsible for the AB error and mnemonic precedence, respectively. More specifically, amnesics and infants may be extremely susceptible to the effects of proactive interference generated by search at location A. Patients' nearly ~e r f e c t recall of location and object on the first A trial in both of the present tasks suggests that interference played a major role in subsequent forgetting. Excellent recall on initial A trials has also been observed in infants (Cummings & Bjork, 1983) . In addition, there is ample evidence from a variety of paradigms that amnesics can be highly sensitive to proactive interference (Kinsboume & U7inocur, 1980; Wanington & Weiskrantz, 1974; Winocur & Weiskrantz, 1976) , and data along these lines have also been reported in studies of infants (Hanis, 1973) .
A more general point to consider in light of our results and of our view of memory development is that tests of symbolic representation, as formulated by Piaget and others, almost invariably require infants to call to mind objects that are not available perceptualiy. If, however, poorly developed recall abilities and consequent sensitivity to interference contribute to infants' apparent failure to demonstrate the capacity for symbolic representation on object search tasks, then it may be necessary to alter the kinds of tasks that are used to determine whether an infant has developed these capacities. What is needed are tasks that do not make demands on latedeveloping forms of memory, because it may be these abilities, rather than the capacity for symbolic representation or object permanence, that are undeveloped in young infants (see Moscovitch, 1985 , for further discussion). One such task has been reported by Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman (in press). They devised a habituation technique for studying object permanence in which infants are exposed to an object, and then view possible and impossible events involving the object when it is occluded. Baillargeon et al, found that infants looked longer at an impossible event involving the occluded object (e.g., another object moving freely through the space occupied by the occluded object) than at a possible event involving the occluded object. On the basis of this observation, they argued that $month-old infants know that obiects continue to exist even when they are occluded. This finding suggests that evidence for object permanence may be obtained even in young infants when a task does not make demands on late-developing forms of memory and thereby supports the notion that apparent absence of symbolic representation is sometimes attributable to memory failure.
